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1 Introduction
Why do people deposit their money in a bank?
This is a basic question and maybe one which is too simple to ask. Since
the 1960s, almost all individuals in the Western world have one or more
bank account(s). It is not unusual that grand-parents open a bank account
for their new-born grand children resulting in the fact that many already
have a bank account while being completely unaware of it. We deposit our
savings in bank accounts, we trust banks to manage our financial assets and
we borrow money to finance our needs both from a private as well as from
a business perspective. The array of services provided by banks vary from
very simple saving accounts to more complex business accounts to very
complex financial products in international business.
Like every industry, the banking industry has a ‘licence-to-operate’,
which is solely based on the trust that we have in this industry. Trust is
needed because the total amount that we have in our bank accounts
exceeds widely the amount of cash available in the market. In this respect,
banks play a fiduciary role in the economy. People ‘believe’ and should con-
tinue to believe that the bank will honour payment instructions at all times.
The bank should always be in a position to have sufficient ‘solvency’1 to
honour all debts at all times. The amount of minimum capital needed to
honour all liabilities is a function of the bank’s risk profile, where ‘risk’ is a
combination of many different risk types. The most important risk types are
credit risk, market risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and
reputation risk.
Integrity of the financial market is essential for maintaining and sustaining
the license-to-operate for institutions in this sector. The abuse of the finan-
cial system by criminals and terrorists may severely impair the sector’s
integrity. Money laundering and terrorist financing are an important threat
1
1. Solvency is the proportion of capital that the bank retains on its balance sheet in relation
to total assets and risk exposure.
to the integrity of financial markets. Although it is not easy to make an
accurate calculation of the financial magnitude of money laundering and
terrorist financing, Unger et al. indicate that the magnitude is not insignifi-
cant based on assumptions made by the International Monetary Fund. She
indicates that the magnitude may be as large as US$ 2.85 trillion per year.2
According to the Ministry of Finance in February 2006, the magnitude of
money laundering in the Netherlands is estimated to be approximately
EUR 18.5 billion annually of which approximately EUR 14.7 billion origi-
nates from foreign illicit activities and the remainder EUR 3.8 billion origi-
nates from domestic crime.3 Keeping this amount in mind, it is unmistak-
able that financial institutions are affected. Only through the network of
banks, amounts of this magnitude can flow around the globe.
Banks play a pivotal role in the economy and without the banking func-
tion the economy would be completely paralysed. This is why the banking
industry is a so-called ‘regulated industry’ in almost all countries in the
world. In most countries there is one regulatory authority for the banking
industry, namely the Central Bank. In the Netherlands, there are two promi-
nent regulatory authorities: the Dutch Central Bank (further: DNB) which is
responsible for prudential supervision4 of the banking industry and the
Authority of Financial Markets (further: AFM), which is responsible for
integrity or behavioural supervision. The main purpose of banking supervi-
sion is to ascertain that banks have appropriate policies and procedures in
place to make adequate risk analyses and take timely action if and when
risk levels exceed the limits set by management. Furthermore, it is essential
that management remains in-control of the risk, which means that risk is
being managed and kept within certain ranges. This is not to state that
banks should avoid risk, but that they accept a level of risk that is consistent
with management’s risk appetite. Because banks are in the risk business
they make money and create shareholder value. However, management
should constantly be aware of the fact that banks are vulnerable to abuse of
their systems by criminals. Managing and controlling reputation risk are
therefore essential parts of risk management and central points of focus in
regulatory supervision.
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2. Unger, Prof. Dr. Brigitte et al., The Amounts and Effects of Money Laundering, Report to the
Ministry of Finance, 16 February 2006.
3. See http://www.minfin.nl/nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten,2006/02/witwassen_in_nederland-
_geschat_op_18x5_miljard_euro_per_jaar.html.
4. Prudential supervision is predominantly focused on the economic soundness of the bank
and its capital adequacy.
Protecting the financial markets from abuse by criminals is only one aspect.
It is a so-called external risk of abuse. However, the protection of the finan-
cial market integrity also has an internal aspect. This is aimed at the inter-
nal governance of financial institutions. Without appropriate internal con-
trols and good corporate governance, financial institutions are vulnerable
and may easily loose reputation as a result of incidents that can occur due
to weaknesses in internal controls. In order to preserve reputation, financial
institutions must take appropriate measures to avoid insider trading by
management and staff, to avoid misuse of privileged information through
so-called ‘Chinese Walls’ between trade desks on one hand and financial
analysts as well as client relationship bankers on the other hand and they
must ensure the credibility of management and staff through screening of
integrity sensitive positions.
This inaugural address is focused on protecting the integrity of financial
markets. A certain emphasis is placed on law and regulation to avoid the
risk of market abuse by criminals. The role and responsibility of auditors as
prescribed in law and regulation will be highlighted. However, it should be
clear that auditors also play an important role in assessing the internal con-
trols and corporate governance of financial institutions and hence have a
role in avoiding the internal risk of loss of reputation. Furthermore, pur-
suant to prevailing law and regulation, auditors do have an information and
reporting duty to the regulatory authorities and hence are an important
source of information for the regulators.
The integrity of the financial markets is not solely the responsibility of
banks, but of financial institutions more in general, which encompass other
businesses in the financial sector as well such as insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, intermediaries, clearing houses etc. However, I will concentrate
on banks more in particular. Secondly, integrity of financial markets is not
only a matter of personal behavioural aspects of management and staff.
Integrity of the financial market is a combined function of capital adequacy
resulting from proper risk management, corporate governance, internal con-
trols and personal integrity of management and staff in concert with sound
supervision of the industry by regulatory authorities.
This inaugural address will start with the European legislative framework to
ascertain financial market integrity. The first regulations date back to the
end of the 1980s and resulted in European Union (further: EU) directives
and adjustment of the laws of EU Member States during the 1990s and into
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this decennium. In spite of EU efforts, an American ‘think tank’ chaired by
Maurice R. Greenberg et al. is quite pessimistic about the EU scrutiny
regarding the global combat against money laundering and the financing of
terrorism.5 The question is really whether EU lawmaking and focus on the
financial markets is indeed substandard.
Being an economist and auditor myself, I will not make judicial judg-
ments nor make legal analyses. I will summarise laws and regulations pro-
mulgated by the EU and some supranational financial institutions such as
the Bank for International Settlements and the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors. I will briefly touch on the current Dutch legislation, in
particular the Law on Financial Supervision (‘Wet op het financieel toezicht’)
and the Law on Unusual Transaction Reporting (‘Wet MOT’) as well as the
Law on Identification with Services (‘WID’). While discussing these laws and
regulations, I will highlight the role of auditors or the audit function in the
context of safeguarding the integrity of the financial market.
§ 1
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5. Greenberg, Maurice R. et al., Terrorist Financing, Report of an Independent Task Force Spon-
sored by the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 2002.
2 Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of
Terrorism (AML/CFT)
2.1 Money laundering
Money laundering is a financial engagement with the purpose to conceal the
origin of the money and to make it appear legitimate and as such enabling
the investment of the money in the economy. In order to make money laun-
dering successful, the first objective is to place the money into the financial
banking system in a way that the true origin is disguised. In the early
1980s, the main source of money laundering was the proceeds from drug
trafficking and drugs dealing. However, all kinds of illegal activities may
generate illicit financial proceeds that give rise to the need to launder the
money prior to investing the results in the economy.
An essential hypothesis is that criminals act in an economic rationale
way. This means that they normally wish to make a return-on-investment
on the profits from illegal and criminal activities. Given the size of illegal
money, criminals may also engage in a rather exhibitionistic lifestyle, but in
essence it is hypothesised that they want to maintain a source of income
from the illicit proceeds of their criminal activities. One way of realising a
return-on-investment is to re-invest the illicit profits in business enterprises
and try to make the appearance of the funding for these investments as nor-
mal and legitimate as possible.
Certainly in the time of drugs trading, much of the financial proceeds
were in cash. In one way or another, this cash had to be deposited on a
bank account. In 1970, the US Administration, in its war against drugs, man-
dated that any cash transactions in excess of US$ 10,000 had to be reported
to the authorities by way of a ‘suspicious activity report’.1 This may have
been the first formal attempt to combat money laundering although this
was not yet formally criminalised. Meanwhile, this monetary threshold has
been set at EUR 15,000 in Europe.
5
1. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, formally enacted as the ‘Bank Records and Foreign Transac-
tions Act’.
In the process of money laundering, three stages are normally distinguished
i.e.:
– placement;
– layering;
– integration.
Placement is the act of depositing money into the financial system. There
are various ways of placing the money into the system, such as by way of
‘smurfing’. Smurfing is depositing small amounts (under the threshold of
US$ 10,000 / EUR 15,000) into different banks and on different bank
accounts. Once the money is credited on the bank accounts, the beneficiary
is in a position to transfer the money to virtually any place in the world by
way of internet banking or wire transfer.
Larger amounts of money can be deposited on bank accounts in coun-
tries and territories with a lack of anti-money laundering legislation, proce-
dures and/or supervision. Given the sheer size of illicit money floating
around the world, criminals may use means of threat, pressure or violence
to place the money on a bank account while trying to avoid that ‘suspicious
activity reports’ be sent to the authorities.
The second stage of money laundering is layering, which is engaging in a
number of (consecutive) financial transactions with the aim to obscure the
link between the money and its origin. The financial transactions have the
purpose to create a very convoluted scheme of money transfers to various
bank accounts in various names in different countries in the world. By
creating chaos and convolution, it becomes increasingly difficult to trace
the flow of funds to its origin, which hampers law enforcement and investi-
gators to prove that this origin is indeed illegal. However, this is not only a
risk for law enforcement, but also for the banking industry. Banks which
are involved in a ‘later stage’ will have increasing difficulty to ascertain the
(il)legality of the source of funds and the source of wealth. Because, the
illegality cannot be proven, which is exactly the purpose of layering, bank
accounts are opened and clients are accepted whereas in reality, the funds
are derived from illegal origin and the clients would not fit the reputation
criteria set by the bank.
Once the layering is completed, the money, which now appears to be
derived from legal sources, can be reinvested into business enterprises. This
is the stage of integration. Because criminals do not want to attract too
much attention, these business enterprises appear perfectly normal. There
are accounting systems, proper records, tax returns, charters and good gov-
ernance. In reality, these enterprises are conduits or ‘faade companies’ hid-
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ing the illegal activities that take place behind the scene. On the other hand,
the apparently ‘normal’ businesses are run by criminals or criminal organi-
sations and as such have a negative effect on the integrity of the business
community in particular and on the integrity of the society at large.
2.2 Terrorist financing
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, New York and the Penta-
gon, Washington DC in September 2001, started an international combat
against the financing of terrorism. Shortly after the attacks, the UN Securi-
ties Council issued a resolution calling states to collaborate in the combat
against terrorism and decided that states will prevent and suppress the
financing of terrorism2. In the same resolution, the Security Council crimina-
lised all means to support terrorism and decided to freeze all financial
means without delay.
In October 2001, the Financial Action Task Force (further: FATF) issued
eight special recommendations to counter terrorist financing.3 In 2004,
these recommendations were updated and a ninth recommendation was
added to the list.
Whilst terrorist financing is distinguished as a predicate offence, FATF spe-
cialists found that the means of terrorist financing do not differ materially
from the means used for the financing of other criminal acts.4 FATF defined
terrorism as an act which is intended to create fear (terror), is perpetrated for
an ideological goal (as opposed to a lone attack), and deliberately target or
disregard the safety of civilians. Many definitions also include only acts of
unlawful violence and acts of war. According to FATF (2001-2002), the objec-
tive of terrorism is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government of
an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.5
According to FATF, there are two main sources for funding terrorism. In
the first place, terrorism can be funded by States and wealthy individuals.
FATF does believe that State sponsored financing of terrorism has declined
over the past years and has been superseded by backing from other sour-
ces.6 The second source of income for terrorism may come from ‘revenue
generating’ activities. These activities can both be legal and illegal in nature.
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) § 2.2
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2. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001.
3. See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_34032073_1-
_1_1_1,00.html.
4. FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001-2002, February 2002.
5. For the definition of terrorism used by the EU, see paragraph 3.3.
6. FATF 2002, p. 2.
For example, financing may come from kidnapping and extortion and it may
come from fund raising activities by charities, political or religious groups.
Once the funds are generated, the money should be laundered in an attempt
to disguise the authorities or at least to avoid attention from that side. Some
of the particular methods mentioned by experts in connection with various
terrorist groups include: cash smuggling (both by couriers or bulk cash
shipments), structured deposits to or withdrawals from bank accounts, pur-
chases of various types of monetary instruments (travellers’ cheques, bank
cheques, money orders), use of credit or debit cards, and wire transfers.
There have also been indications that some forms of underground banking
have had a role in moving terrorist related funds.7
2.3 Hawala banking
Hawala Banking is also known as ‘underground banking’ or transmitting
money without moving money. According to Jost and Shandu,8 hawala
banking is an alternative remittance system and the classification as ‘under-
ground banking’ is not always justified as the system is widely and openly
advertised in many Western countries as is illustrated by the advertisement
which can be found in many American newspapers.
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7. Ibid p. 4-5.
8. Jost, Patrick M., Harjit Singh Sandhu, The hawala alternative remittance system and its role
in money laundering, Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon, January 2000.
Although, the second bullet does not specifically state that the persons men-
tioned are bankers (called: hawaladas), it is a typical announcement for
such services.
Hawala banking is a remittance system originated from India and Paki-
stan and it exists next to alternative systems originating from other coun-
tries. For hawala banking to be successful, three components are necessary
i.e.:
– trust;
– network;
– clearing system (record keeping).
The system is used to transmit money, usually between countries. It is
widely used by Indian or Pakistani workers in the Western world for trans-
mitting money to their families at home. For these workers there are basi-
cally two possibilities to transmit money. Either they transmit funds by
using a Western bank or they make use of the hawala system. Based on
their investigations, Jost et al. (2000) state that Indians and Pakistani in
many cases rely more on the hawala system than on Western banking.
Vaknin states that ‘Hawala consists of transferring money (usually across
borders and in order to avoid taxes or the need to bribe officials) without
physical or electronic transfer of funds’.9 The fact that taxes and also bribe
may be avoided is a good reason for people to choose for the hawala sys-
tem. The transmission of funds usually takes one day and the only consid-
eration is that there is a rather lengthy time zone difference between the
Western World on one hand and Pakistan and India on the other hand.
Hawala banking works with hawaladas on either side of the transmission
i.e. one hawalada in the Western world and a counterpart in Pakistan or
India. These two hawaladas form part of a network. In many cases the net-
work consists of family relationships or close relatives and friends. It is also
possible that the network consists of business partners. That is why hawala
banking is sometimes an off shoot of an import/export business.
Finally, it is necessary to maintain accounting records i.e. a clearing sys-
tem with debits and credits. This can best be explained with an example
(derived from Jost et al. (2000)):
A Pakistani wishes to transmit US$ 5,000 from New York to his family in Pakistan. He
chooses to transmit the funds through the hawala system. The hawalada offers him
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) § 2.3
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9. Vaknin, Sam PhD, ‘Hawala, the Bank that never was’, http://www.executivecoachingstu-
dio.com/hawalanever.htm.
35 Rp/$ and a fee of Rp 1 for each dollar. Based on this, the Pakistani can transmit
Rp 170,000 to his family (Rp 175,000 minus Rp 5,000 for the fee).
The New York hawalada now has a deposit of US$ 5,000 and a liability of Rp 170,000
to the counterpart in Pakistan. This can be cleared in different ways. Firstly, if the New
York hawalada does import/export business, an amount of US$ 5,000 can be discounted
on an invoice to the counterpart in Pakistan. It is also possible that the New York hawa-
lada has a large amount of Rupees in Pakistan, which cannot be transmitted to the US
because of foreign exchange restrictions. By engaging in hawala banking, the Rupees are
gradually exchanged for US Dollar, while avoiding foreign exchange restrictions.
Analysing the hawala banking system, it becomes clear that all components
of traditional Western banking do exist. There must be trust, there is a net-
work and there are accounting records. In traditional Western banking, the
network exists in the form of correspondent and respondent banking rela-
tionships and records are kept in form of nostro and loro accounts, which is
basically exactly the same as the record keeping system in the hawala sys-
tem.
The only one and probably major difference between traditional Western
banking and hawala banking is that the latter is executed under the radar
screen of regulatory authorities. Because there is no regulatory supervision,
there are no official statistics indicating the volume of hawala banking and
it makes the hawala system more vulnerable for abuse by criminals and ter-
rorists. This is why the hawala system is sometimes called ‘a banking sys-
tem built for terrorism’.10 However, if the total amount of illicit money is
taken into consideration, it is inconceivable that all of this money flows
through hawala or alternate systems. In other words: also the traditional
Western banking system is affected by the flow of illicit funds.11
In a recent study by David Seddon,12 it is indicated that there is massive
growth of money transmissions, but that it is still difficult to measure the
transmissions accurately because of diverting definitions used in the official
statistics of many countries. According to this study, the global remittance
§ 2.3
10
10. Ganguly, Meenakshi, ‘A Banking System Built for Terrorism, – Time in partnership with
CNN’, 5 October 2001, see http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,178227,00.-
html.
11. For a brief description of Malaysian money changers, see Vlcek, William, European mea-
sures to combat terrorist financing and the tension between liberty and security, London
School of Economics, September 2005, p. 16.
12. Seddon, David, Informal money transfers: Economic links between UK diaspora groups
and recipients ‘back home’, Centre for the Study of Financial Information, November
2007.
flow amounts to approximately US$ 200 billion. According to Seddon, in the
aftermath of the September 2001 events, there is indeed growing concern
about the financing of terrorism. Whilst there was a tendency of relaxation
of foreign exchange controls in the EU in the 1970s and 1980s, the pressure
to formally regulate the transmissions of money has increased considerably
after 9/11. However, there is still no regulatory system that ensures supervi-
sion and statistical record building of global informal remittances.
2.4 Legislative initiatives
Since many years there is growing international attention for the integrity
of financial markets. The Dutch legal and regulatory initiatives in this area
cannot be looked at in isolation; they form part of similar developments in
the international arena. An important historic milestone in the fight against
abuse of the financial system was the development of 40 Recommendations
by the FATF13 in 1990. The FATF was founded in 1989 by the G-7 countries
to develop anti-money laundering strategies. The 40 Recommendations per-
tain to three main areas i.e. the legal system, financial institutions and insti-
tutional measures. They provide a complete set of counter-measures against
money laundering and have been recognised, endorsed, or adopted by many
international bodies. Regarding the legal system, the core recommendations
pertain to the need to arrive at a legal framework against money laundering
and to criminalise money laundering in its own right. According to FATF,
financial institutions have to establish policies and procedures to ‘know
your client’ (further: KYC) and to report suspicious activities by clients to
financial intelligence units. The well known acronym ‘KYC’ is directly
derived from the 40 FATF Recommendations. Finally, in respect of institu-
tional measures FATF recommends that enhanced international collabora-
tion between governments take place and that States enter into bilateral
and multilateral treaties to facilitate seizure and forfeiture of illicit proceeds
of money laundering.
Following the money laundering scandal in which Bank of Credit and
Commerce International was involved, the American Administration enacted
the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act 1992. This act, which is
nick-named ‘bank death penalty’, gives bank regulators the power to order
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) § 2.4
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13. See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
a bank that has been convicted of a money laundering offence to cease
operations.14
Another international initiative, which took place in 2000, is the estab-
lishment of The Wolfsberg Group, which is an association of twelve interna-
tional banks and an NGO15 aimed at developing financial services industry
standards, and related products, for KYC, Anti-Money Laundering (further:
AML) and Counter Terrorist Financing policies. Whilst most legislation is
prepared and enacted in the public domain by legislators, the Wolfsberg
Group is a private initiative which has resulted in issuing eleven anti-
money laundering principles in 2000, which were revised in 2002. It should
be noted that the Wolfsberg Principles apply to private banking activities
rather than the comprehensive set of banking services. However, banks are
encouraged to apply the Wolfsberg Principles in each of their legal entities
and subsidiary companies, in particular in countries with a known lack of
anti-money laundering or banking supervision system. Following the eleven
principles for private banking, the Wolfsberg Group has issued six new
statements on various issues such as principles for correspondent banking,
screening and searching, and managing money laundering risks.
It is quite obvious that the events of 11 September 2001 have acceler-
ated the enactment of laws and regulations to protect the financial system
from being abused in general and for financing terrorist activities in particu-
lar. Since the events of September 2001, regulatory requirements for the
financial industry have strengthened significantly. In the first place, shortly
after the September 2001 events, the American Administration enacted the
so-called USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 on 26 October 2001. The act may be
cited as the ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT of
2001)’. More in particular Title III of this act16 is aimed at combating money
laundering and terrorist financing. In the act, reference is made to the global
magnitude of money laundering. The global flow of illicit cash is the pri-
mary source of financing of terrorist and illegal or fraudulent activity. The
main purpose of the act is to protect society against the negative effects of
terrorist, illegal and fraudulent activity through broadening the abilities of
§ 2.4
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14. Hinterseer, Kris, ‘The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles’, Journal of Money
Laundering Control, Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 2001, p. 25-41.
15. The twelve banks are: Deutsche Bank, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, ABN AMRO, Credit Suisse, UBS,
HSBC, Barclays, Banco Santander, Citybank, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Bank of
Tokyo. Furthermore, Transparency International is a member of the group.
16. Title III is titled: International Money Laundering abatement and Anti Terrorist Financing
Act of 2001.
various US federal agencies and by enforcing strengthened oversight over
the financial markets. Article 352, sub 1 (D) states that an independent
audit forms part of the anti-money laundering programmes that have to be
established by banks. The law is unclear whether this audit can be per-
formed by an internal audit department that is independent from the com-
pliance department or that it must be carried out by the institution’s exter-
nal auditor. In the remainder of this Act, the explicit role of external or
internal audit in the combat against money laundering and terrorist finan-
cing is not highlighted.
Even though the events of 11 September 2001 had a major impact on
law making and issuing of new regulations, also prior to this date there was
substantial attention and law making aiming at protecting the integrity
financial markets. On a multilateral level, the United Nations have issued a
number of resolutions aiming at curtailing money laundering. The most
important resolutions can be summarised as follows:17
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988, the Vienna Convention)
The Vienna Convention, as it is commonly known, deals primarily with the illicit drug
trade and related law enforcement issues. It is the first UN Convention to define the con-
cept of ‘money laundering’, even though it does not use that term, and it calls on coun-
tries to criminalise the activity. This convention is limited, however, to drug trafficking
offences and does not address the preventative aspects of the crime.
The International Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2000, the
Palermo Convention)
This convention contains a broad range of provisions to fight organised crime. With
respect to money laundering, it requires countries to criminalise money laundering and
include all serious crimes as predicate offences of money laundering (not just drug-
related offences), plus permit the required criminal knowledge or intent to be inferred
from objective facts, not proven individually;
– establish regulatory regimes to deter and detect all form of money laundering;
– authorise domestic and international co-operation and exchanges of information
among administrative, regulatory, law enforcement, and other types of authorities;
– promote the establishment of governmental units to centrally collect, analyse, and
disseminate information.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)
This convention requires countries to criminalise terrorism, terrorist organisations, and
terrorist acts. Under this convention, it is unlawful for any person to provide or collect
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) § 2.4
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17. Financial Sector Assessment, A Handbook, The Worldbank and the International Monetary
Fund, Washington DC, 2005, Chapter 8.
funds with the intent or knowledge that the funds will be used to carry out any defined
acts of terrorism.
Security Council Resolution 1373
This resolution obligates all countries to criminalise actions to finance terrorism. This
resolution also obligates countries to deny all forms of support to terrorist groups and
to freeze assets of those involved in terrorist acts. It also encourages co-operation
among countries for criminal investigations and for sharing information about planned
terrorist acts.
Security Council Resolution 1267 and its Successors
Security Council Resolution 1267 required all countries to freeze the assets of the Tali-
ban and entities owned or controlled by them, as determined by the ‘Sanctions Commit-
tee’. Later, Resolution 1333 added the assets of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to the
freezing list. Subsequent resolutions established monitoring arrangements (Resolution
1363), merged earlier lists (Resolution 1390), provided some exclusions (Resolution
1452), and improved implementation measures (Resolution 1455). Together, the various
lists for freezing assets are maintained and updated by the ‘1267 Committee’ and are
published on the UN’s website.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Associa-
tion of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), and International Organisation of Secu-
rities Commissioners (IOSCO) have each issued broad supervisory standards
and guidelines on a wide range of supervisory issues, including money laun-
dering as it relates to banking, insurance, and securities. The initiatives
taken by IAIS and IOSCO are summarised below:18
IAIS
This association has issued its Guidance Paper 5, ‘Anti-Money-Laundering Guidance
Notes for Insurance Supervisors and Insurance Entities’, which parallels the Basel Com-
mittee’s statement on prevention. It contains four principles that should be embraced
by insurance entities:
– comply with anti-money-laundering laws;
– have know-your-customer procedures in place;
– co-operate with all law enforcement authorities;
– have internal anti-money-laundering policies, procedures, and training programmes
for employees.
IOSCO
This organisation passed its ‘Resolution on Money Laundering’ to be implemented by
securities regulators in individual countries. It consists of seven specific areas for securi-
ties regulators to consider in establishing requirements for firms under their jurisdiction:
– the extent of customer identifying information with a view towards enhancing the
ability of authorities to identify and prosecute money launderers;
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– the adequacy of record-keeping requirements to reconstruct financial transactions;
– whether an appropriate manner is used to address the reporting of suspicious trans-
actions;
– what procedures are in place to prevent criminals from obtaining control of securi-
ties businesses and to share information with foreign counterparts;
– whether means are appropriate for monitoring compliance procedures designed to
deter and detect money laundering;
– the use of cash and cash equivalents in securities transactions, including documenta-
tion to reconstruct transactions;
– whether means are appropriate to share information to combat money laundering.
The question is to what extent these international resolutions have a direct
effect on the accountability and liability of companies. Bleker19 indicated
that whilst the subject of ‘international law’ is extremely complex, legal
accountability for companies as a result of international law has increased
over time. As a result of the growing globalisation of the economy there is a
trend to enter in an increasing number of international treaties and resolu-
tions. However, many states are reluctant to decrease their sovereignty in
exchange for more power by international bodies. There are two exceptions,
i.e. the EU and the United Nations. These two international bodies do have
legislative power, based on which Member States have to adjust their own
laws. Regulations promulgated by these two bodies may therefore have a
more direct impact on business organisations.
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3 EU Legislation
3.1 Recommendation R(80)10 and Convention 141
Within the EU (see also Vlcek, 2005), Recommendation R(80)10 of 27 June
1980 ‘On measures against the transfer and the safekeeping of funds of criminal
origin’ was one of the first multilateral initiatives to protect the financial
system from being abused for criminal or terrorist means. In this recom-
mendation, the committee of ministers makes the recommendation to
Member States that their governments:
‘a. arrange for the following measures to be taken by their banking sys-
tem:
i. identity checks on customers whenever:
– an account or a securities deposit is opened;
– safe-deposits are rented;
– cash transactions involving sums of a certain magnitude are
effected, bearing in mind the possibility of transactions in
several parts;
– inter-bank transfers involving sums of a certain magnitude
are made, bearing in mind the possibility of transactions in
several parts.
These checks must be made on the basis of an official docu-
ment or, where the relationship with the customer has been
established through correspondence or through a third party,
by equivalent means;
ii. rental of safe-deposits only to persons or firms with whom the
bank has already had dealings over a certain period or whom
the bank can regard as trustworthy on the strength of refer-
ences;
iii. constitution of reserve stocks of banknotes whose serial num-
bers are made known to the authorities if the banknotes have
been used in connection with criminal offences;
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iv. suitable training for cashiers, particularly in checking identity
papers and detecting criminal behaviour;
b. establish close national and international co-operation, inter alia with
the help of Interpol, between banks and the appropriate authorities in
exchanging information about the circulation of banknotes which
have been used in connection with criminal offences and in following
their movements;
c. set up machinery enabling banks, either by systematic comparison or
by spot-checks, to refer to the list of banknotes used in connection
with criminal offences when notes are paid in.’1
Following Recommendation R(80)10, the Member States of the Council of
Europe agreed on the European Convention No. 141 ‘Convention on launder-
ing, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime’ (further: Con-
vention 141) which was issued on 8 November 1990 and entered into force
on 1 September 1993.2 The foundation for this convention was laid during
the meeting of European Ministers of Justice at a conference in Oslo, Nor-
way on 17-19 June 1986. During this conference the ministers discussed
ways to smash the drugs market, which was often linked with organised
crime. In order to achieve this main objective, the convention considered
that international co-operation was a prerequisite. For this international co-
operation to be effective, it was deemed necessary to arrive at shared con-
cepts and principles of law. However, it was also considered that Member
States’ legislation differed widely, which might easily impair international
co-operation. Another main purpose of the convention was to complement
already existing instruments, drawn up within the framework of the Council
of Europe. In this respect, complementing existing instruments is meant to
be mutual assistance in criminal matters and enhanced investigative assis-
tance between ‘judicial’ authorities in areas such as asset tracing. Co-opera-
tion between police authorities for the same purpose would normally not
be covered by the terms of the convention.3
The main purpose of Convention 141 was to enhance international colla-
boration between states with regard to investigative assistance, search, sei-
zure and confiscation of proceeds from all types of crime which normally
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2. See also Mul V., Banken en Witwassen, Sanders Instituut 1999 (Diss. EUR), p. 48-53.
3. Council of Europe, Convention No. 141 ‘Convention on laundering, search, seizure and
confiscation of the proceeds from crime’, Explanatory Report, paragraph 8-9.
generate large profits. In arriving at the final wording of the Convention
141, the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances of 19984 has played an important role. Article
2, paragraph 1 of the convention, calls for international collaboration in the
fight against drugs and psychotropic substances. Further measures such as
confiscation are dealt with in Article 5 of the convention. According to the
convention, confiscation applies for:
a. Proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with Article 3,
paragraph 1, or property the value of which corresponds to that of such
proceeds;
b. Narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, materials and equipment or
other instrumentalities used in or intended for use in any manner in
offences established in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 1.
3.2 The need for a broader scope
Whilst the 1988 UN Convention played an important role as a basis for Con-
vention 141, its scope was limited to the combat against illicit proceeds
from trading in drugs and psychotropic substances. Clearly, the combat
against money laundering and the abuse of the financial system in general,
warrants a much broader scope than the one provided for in the 1988 UN
Convention. Furthermore, as a result of a changing environment in the com-
bat against money laundering and financial crime during the 1990s, Con-
vention 141 was revised and ultimately reissued as Convention 198 on 16
May 2005. Although, Convention 198 was renewed in order to closely
respond to the changed environment of financial crime and the financing of
terrorism, the fundamental principle of Convention 141 remained
untouched. This principle is ‘to provide a complete set of rules, covering all
the stages of the procedure from the first investigations to the imposition
and enforcement of confiscation sentences and to allow for flexible but
effective mechanisms of international cooperation to the widest extent pos-
sible in order to deprive criminals of the instruments and fruits of their ille-
gal activities’.5
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5. Council of Europe, Convention No. 198 ‘Convention on laundering, search, seizure and
confiscation of the proceeds from crime and on the financing of terrorism’, 16 May
2005, Explanatory Report, paragraph 5.
Between 1990 and 2005 much changed in the environment of money
laundering as well as the law enforcement thereof within the EU, which
gave rise to revising Convention 141 and compiling Convention 198. In the
first place, much experience had been gained following various evaluations
of the FATF 40 Recommendations. Initially developed in 1990, the recom-
mendations were revised for the first time in 1996 to take into account
changes in money laundering trends and to anticipate potential future
threats. More recently, in 2003, the FATF has completed a thorough review
and update of the 40 Recommendations. The FATF has also elaborated on
various Interpretative Notes which are designed to clarify the application of
specific recommendations and to provide additional guidance.6 Furthermore,
pursuant to the events of 11 September 2001, the FATF came out with ini-
tially eight and later nine special recommendations focusing on the combat
against financing of terrorism.7 In December 2001, the European Directive
of June 1991 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for pur-
poses of money laundering was substantially adjusted.8 Among the reasons
to adjust the 1991 EC Directive in 2001 was the need to clarify which state
authority should receive and act upon so-called suspicious activity reports
(further: SAR) from branches of financial institutions having the head office
in another state. Further there was a need for clarification which state
authority had responsibility to ensure that branches of financial institutions
comply with the Directive. In addition to these adjustments, it was consid-
ered that certain financial service providers such as ‘currency exchange
offices’ and ‘money transmitters’ were particularly vulnerable to money
laundering and that these service providers had to be brought into the
scope of the Directive. Another important reason to adjust the 1991 EC
Directive in 2001 was the limited scope of the 1991 Directive. In fact, the
scope of this directive was to combat the laundering of proceeds from
drugs offences. Clearly, this was in line with the 1988 UN Vienna Conven-
tion. However, it became clear that a much wider definition of money laun-
dering had to be applied. Money laundering takes place based on a broader
range of underlying or predicate offences than just drugs offences.
For the same reason, the FATF revised the 40 Recommendations. In
Recommendation 1, the FATF defines the scope of money laundering and
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2001.
reference is made to the 1998 UN Vienna Convention and the 2000 UN Con-
vention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention), more
in particular Article 6 and 7 of the convention.9 In the legislative guide to
this convention,10 the broad scope is defined as follows:
‘(a)(i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such prop-
erty is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any
person who is involved in the commission of the predicate
offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action;
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime;
(b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the
time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime;
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit,
attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and coun-
selling the commission of any of the offences established in
accordance with this article.’
In the first of the 40 Recommendations, FATF recommends that money laun-
dering be criminalised as a predicate offence.11 Predicate offences may be
described by reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a
category of serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to
the predicate offence (threshold approach), or to a list of predicate offences,
or a combination of these approaches.
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3.3 Council Regulation 2580/2001
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Council of Eu-
rope gathered in an extraordinary meeting on 28 September 2001 and
issued Council Regulation 2580/2001.
According to this resolution, the EU Council stated that combating the
funding of terrorism is a decisive aspect of the fight against terrorism and
called upon the Council to take the necessary measures to combat any form
of financing terrorist activities. Further, the Council referred to United
Nation Security Council Resolution 1373(2001), in which the United Nations
Security Council decided that all States should implement a freezing of
funds and other financial assets or economic resources against persons who
commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or who participate in or facili-
tate the commission of such acts.
The EU Council referred to a position paper i.e. the Council common
position of 27 December 2001.12 In this common position paper, the EU
Council defined terrorism in Article 1, paragraph 3 as follows:
‘For the purposes of this Common Position, ‘‘terrorist act’’ shall mean one
of the following intentional acts, which, given its nature or its context,
may seriously damage a country or an international organisation, as
defined as an offence under national law, where committed with the
aim of:
(i) seriously intimidating a population, or
(ii) unduly compelling a Government or an international organisa-
tion to perform or abstain from performing any act, or
(iii) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an
international organisation:
(a) attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;
(b) attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
(c) kidnapping or hostage taking;
(d) causing extensive destruction to a Government or public
facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, includ-
ing an information system, a fixed platform located on the
continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely
to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
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(e) seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods
transport;
(f) manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or
use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chem-
ical weapons, as well as research into, and development of,
biological and chemical weapons;
(g) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, explosions
or floods the effect of which is to endanger human life;
(h) interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or
any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which
is to endanger human life;
(i) threatening to commit any of the acts listed under a) to (h);
(j) directing a terrorist group;
(k) participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including
by supplying information or material resources, or by fund-
ing its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact
that such participation will contribute to the criminal activ-
ities of the group.
For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘‘terrorist group’’ shall mean a struc-
tured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time
and acting in concert to commit terrorist acts. ‘‘Structured group’’ means
a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of a
terrorist act and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its
members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure.’
Following this common position the EU pursued the freezing of funds, other
financial assets and economic resources of alleged terrorists. Further, the EU
Council agreed and decided that it would pursue collaboration between the
EU Member States and to provide the widest possible assistance in prevent-
ing and combating terrorist acts.
3.4 The auditor’s role in EU Directives
Following Convention 198 of 1991 and 2001 respectively, the EU issues EU
Directive 2001/9713 in December 2001. The purpose of this directive is to
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system for the purpose of money laundering – Commission Declaration.
protect the financial system of abuse from money laundering and terrorist
financing activities. The spectrum of this directive has been broadened in
such a way that its provisions also apply to professional activities of exter-
nal auditors and tax consultants. The directive’s scope widened to also
include the money laundering of proceeds from severe punishable acts. A
definition of what ‘severe punishable acts’ meant to be was not given yet.
However, EU ministers agree that ‘financing of terrorism’ forms part of a
‘severe punishable act’.
In 2003, FATF has given more detailed guidance regarding client identifica-
tion, client verification, situations of increased money laundering risk as
well as situation with a decreased money laundering risk. The revised 40
FATF Recommendations now form part of the EU legislation and accordingly
of the legislation of EU Member States. Based on a revision of the FATF 40
Recommendations in 2003, which now also included the financing of terror-
ism into the definition of money laundering, the EU promulgated a new
directive, EU Directive 2005/6014 on 26 October 2005. In fact, the European
ministers fully endorsed the 40 FATF Recommendations including the nine
additional recommendations with regard to the combat against terrorist
financing through including the spirit of the recommendations into a new
European Directive.
In the latest EU Directive (2005/60), the role and responsibilities of the
external auditor are described. According to Article 20 of the EU Directive
2005/60, Member States shall require that the institutions and persons cov-
ered by this directive, auditors included, pay special attention to any activity
which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to
money laundering or terrorist financing and in particular complex or un-
usually large transactions and all unusual patterns of transactions, which
have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose. However, based on
Article 23 of the EU Directive 2005/60, the duty to report does not apply to
external auditors with regard to information they receive from or obtain on
one of their clients, in the course of ascertaining the legal position for their
client or performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or
concerning judicial proceedings, including advice on instituting or avoiding
proceedings, whether such information is received or obtained before, dur-
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ing or after such proceedings. In this regard, it should be noted that in the
Dutch environment, the external auditor usually does not represent the
client in legal or judicial proceedings. This would impair the independence
of the external auditor and it is in violation with the provisions of the
Dutch regulation regarding auditor independence.15
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4 Bank for International Settlements Regulations
4.1 General
The Bank for International Settlements (further: BIS)1 is an international
organisation which fosters international monetary and financial co-opera-
tion and serves as a bank for central banks. The BIS is head quartered in
Basel, Switzerland and fullfils its mandate as:
– a forum to promote discussion and policy analysis among central banks
and within the international financial community;
– a centre for economic and monetary research;
– a prime counterparty for central banks in their financial transactions;
– agent or trustee in connection with international financial operations.
The BIS has issued a number of highly authoritative papers which provide
practical guidance to central banks and financial institutions. Many of the
BIS papers pertain more or less directly to the establishment of sound cor-
porate governance and the regulatory supervision thereof at banks. The
issue of compliance and the integrity of financial markets are widely
described in these papers as is the responsibility of various parties such as
management, compliance officer, internal and external audit and the role of
supervisors.
Within the BIS organisation the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(further: BCBS) is located. According to the BIS website, the objective of the
BCBS is ‘[to provide] a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory
matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues
and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide. It seeks to do so
by exchanging information on national supervisory issues, approaches and
techniques, with a view to promoting common understanding. At times, the
Committee uses this common understanding to develop guidelines and
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supervisory standards in areas where they are considered desirable. In this
regard, the Committee is best known for its international standards on capi-
tal adequacy; the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; and the
Concordat on cross-border banking supervision’.2
In the past years, the BCBS has issued a number of authoritative papers
with regard to the corporate governance, compliance function and internal
audit function of financial institutions. These are the most important
papers:
– Framework for internal control systems in banking organisations, Sep-
tember 1998;
– Customer due diligence for banks, October 2001;
– Internal audit in banks and the supervisor’s relationship with auditors: A
survey, August 2002;
– Compliance and the compliance function of banks, April 2005;
– Core principles methodology, October 2005;
– Enhancing corporate governance for banking organisations, July 2005;
– Core principles methodology, Consultative Document, April 2006.
In the following paragraphs, reference will be made to the above-mentioned
papers.
4.2 Audit in BCBS Papers
According to the BCBS, corporate governance of banks is of greater impor-
tance that in other business organisations because of the crucial role banks
play as financial intermediaries and the degree of sensitivity of potential dif-
ficulties arising from ineffective corporate governance and of weaknesses in
controls. It is the responsibility of management to establish proper corpo-
rate governance. From a banking industry perspective, corporate governance
involves the manner in which the business and affairs of individual institu-
tions are governed by their boards of directors and senior management,
which affects how banks:
– set corporate objectives (including generating economic returns to own-
ers);
– run the day-to-day operations of the business;
– meet the obligation of accountability to the shareholders and take into
account the interests of other recognised stakeholders;
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– align corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that banks
will operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with appli-
cable laws and regulations; and
– protect the interests of depositors.3
According to the BCBS, a competent and independent audit function is a
vital part of the organisation’s corporate governance. One of the important
audit roles is identifying problems with a company’s risk management and
internal control systems and ensuring that the bank’s financial statements
fairly represent the financial position and performance of the company in
all material respects. The BCBS also recommends that the board of directors
meet with the external and internal auditor as well as with the head of
compliance in the absence of management at least annually so as to
strengthen and emphasise the independence of audit and compliance
reporting to the board.4 The BCBS recommends that banks establish an
internal audit function.5 In the same way, the BCBS recommends that banks
establish an independent compliance function. Both functions should have
direct reporting lines to the board.6
Both the compliance and the audit function can only exist and perform
in a professional way when there is sufficient support from top manage-
ment. For both functions, top management should be defined as the chief
executive officer or chairman of the managing board. Only with reporting
lines directly to the CEO or chairman of the managing board, both functions
will obtain a sufficient status in the entire organisation. In its Principle 1
(BCBS, 2005-1, p. 9) the BCBS specifically recommend that it is the responsi-
bility of the board to oversee the bank’s management of compliance risk.
The head of compliance should therefore have direct access to the board for
presenting the compliance policy, the compliance plan and the compliance
report on a regular basis.
The core function of compliance is to support managing compliance risk,
which is defined as the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material finan-
cial loss, or loss of reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to
comply with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organisation
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standards, and codes of conduct applicable to its banking activities
(together, ‘compliance laws, rules and standards’) (BCBS, 2005-1, p. 7). In this
respect, the compliance function is responsible to establish an appropriate
compliance infrastructure, which activates top management support. Line
management is responsible for ensuring full adherence with the compliance
infrastructure at all times. The compliance function itself should be subject
to audit. This audit can be performed by the internal audit function within
the bank, provided that the internal audit function has appropriate compli-
ance expertise and is sufficiently independent from the compliance function.
The purpose of this audit is to ascertain that the compliance infrastructure,
as established by the compliance function, is consistent with applicable law
and regulation, BCBS regulations included. Furthermore, audit should ascer-
tain that compliance policies and procedures are adhered to by manage-
ment. The audit report with regard to compliance should be forwarded
directly to the board, whose role it is to oversee the compliance function.
The core task of internal audit is to audit the organisation’s internal control
systems comprising of operational controls, including ICT controls, and
financial controls and to report on its findings to top management and the
board of directors.
In the recent past, an internal control system had to be compliant with
the Regulation on Organisation and Control (ROC),7 which has been super-
seded since the enactment of the Law on Financial Supervision in 2007.
Analysing the ROC more in detail, it becomes apparent that the institu-
tion’s system of internal controls must broadly comply with the COSO8
model. This means that the main components of the COSO model are inte-
grated in the ROC. In 2004, COSO revised the internal control integrated
model and issued the so-called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) frame-
work.9 The 1992 COSO components are also included in this ERM frame-
work.
These ERM components are:
– Internal Environment;
– Objective Setting;
– Event Identification;
– Risk Assessment;
– Risk Response;
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– Control Activities;
– Information & Communication;
– Monitoring.
After superseding the ROC with the enactment of the Law on Financial
Supervision, the COSO model of internal control remains applicable and con-
tinues to be a widely acknowledged international standard for internal con-
trols.
4.3 The auditor’s role and responsibility pursuant to Basel II
According to Saidenberg and Schuermann,10 there are basically two reasons
for capital regulation of financial institutions. The first is the protection of
consumers from better informed and opaque financial institutions. The sec-
ond is the systemic risk to which banks are exposed. Financial institutions
are exposed to systemic risk because of their role in the international pay-
ment system, their – sometimes highly – leveraged and fragile financial
position. The fragility of the financial position has become clear and has sur-
faced dramatically in the recent period after September 2007 due to the so-
called ‘sub-prime crisis’. In the period following September 2007, amounts
for loan and mortgage assets exceeding US$ 200 billion have been written
off globally by financial institutions and some of them have arrived at the
brink of bankruptcy, such as Northern Rock in England and Bear Stearns in
the US. Basically, the capitalisation fragility of financial institutions materi-
alises when these institutions are impaired in funding their activities, which
is a direct result of loss of trust. The sub-prime crisis is a funding and
mutual trust crisis among financial institutions in the first place rather than
a crisis resulting from a valuation impairment of certain high risk assets.
In 1988, the BCBS set minimum capital standards for banks in the so-
called Basel Capital Accord, or Basel I. Later in 2004, the BCBS issued the
New Capital Accord, or Basel II, which is based on three pillars (BCBS, 2006-
2).
Pillar 1 sets out the rules for minimum capital requirements for banks.
The minimum capital requirements is a function of the institution’s risk pro-
file, predominantly determined by its risk weighted assets on the balance
sheet.
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Pillar 2 is about the key principles of supervisory review, risk manage-
ment guidance and supervisory transparency and accountability produced
by the BCBS with respect to banking risks, including guidance relating to,
among other things, the treatment of interest rate risk in the banking book,
credit risk (stress testing, definition of default, residual risk, and credit con-
centration risk), operational risk, enhanced cross-border communication
and cooperation, and securitisation.
The core rationale for Pillar 3 ‘Market Discipline’ is to complement the
provisions of Pillar 1 (minimum capital requirements) and Pillar 2 (princi-
ples for supervision) with disclosure rules allowing market participants to
assess the information and hence the capital adequacy of the reporting
financial institution.
A basic underlying principle in Basel II is that banks must have an inter-
nal procedure to assess capital adequacy based on the risk profile and expo-
sure of its operations. Banks must have a strategy for maintaining adequate
capital levels over time.
Internal and external auditors have a specific role and responsibility follow-
ing the New Capital Accord or Basel II. While the role and responsibility of
auditors is generally clear, Basel II is not always consistent regarding the
specific or distinct responsibilities of internal versus external auditors. In
some instances both audit functions are mentioned, whereas in other cases
only external auditors are mentioned to have a certain responsibility.
Banks must maintain an internal audit function (BCBS, 2002) and must
also appoint an external auditor to audit the financial statements and
monthly statements to the regulators. It is the responsibility of both audit
functions i.e. internal and external, to arrive at a smooth professional colla-
boration resulting in coverage of the entire audit spectrum. The audit spec-
trum can be defined as the comprehensive scope of operational, ICT and
financial audit areas. Audit coverage should be such that there is a mini-
mum of redundancy and overlap between the work of both audit functions
while audit gaps in the spectrum should be avoided to a maximum extent.
In this spectrum, the external auditor has the predominant professional
responsibility for the financial audit, whereas the internal auditor has the
same responsibility for the operational audit. With regard to the ICT audit,
both audit functions have distinct professional responsibilities, which gives
rise to the need for tight collaboration.
Following the underlying principle that the bank must make its own assess-
ment of capital adequacy based on an internal assessment of risk exposure,
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it is the responsibility of the audit function, i.e. internal and/or external
audit to review this internal process of risk assessment and capital calcula-
tion. It is possible that the primary audit assessment be performed by the
internal audit department, in which case the external auditor should review
the internal auditor’s work. While avoiding redundancy to a maximum
extent, the external auditor should perform his own assessment so as to
satisfy independency requirements and to avoid becoming too much depen-
dent on the internal audit function.
To assess the risk profile and exposure, banks make use of risk validation
models. The purpose of these models is to calculate the value at risk (or:
VaR) for credit risk, market risk, interest rate risk and other risk types. It is
the auditor’s responsibility to validate the models by:
– internally validating the risk assessment process applied by the bank;
– ensuring that the formulae used to calculate prices of options and other
complex derivative instruments are appropriate under the circumstances
and that these formulae are applied consistently;
– ascertaining that the models used are adequate and consistent given the
bank’s risk and business profiles;
– ascertaining that the bank’s internal back-testing11 of the models used is
adequate;
– ensuring that the data flows used in the models are adequate and reli-
able.
Finally, even though internal and external auditors (must) collaborate
smoothly, both audit functions have distinct responsibilities that may also
effect their roles in view of Basel II. The core responsibility of the external
auditor is the audit of the financial statements and the monthly statements
to the regulators. The responsibility of the external auditor following Basel
II should be interpreted in this context also. Ultimately, the external auditor
issues an audit opinion on the true and fair view of the financial statements,
which includes an opinion whether or not international financial reporting
standards have been applied correctly and consistently.
The responsibility of the internal auditor follows from the BCBS papers
and the charter of the internal audit function applied by the bank. The
focus of internal audit is on operational, financial and ICT controls.
Bank for International Settlements Regulations § 4.3
31
11. Back-testing is the process where the outcome of mathematical models such as calcu-
lated ‘value-at-risk’ and ‘loss-given-default’ are verified with actual results in the past.
There are strict independence requirements for internal audit also. Since
the introduction of the by-law on professional behaviour for auditors,12 the
internal auditor must be independent from anyone in the organisation who
is responsible for an audit object except for the CEO or chairman of the
managing board. As a result of this independence requirement, the internal
auditor should not be involved in model building or the establishment of an
enterprise risk management function. The internal auditor should restrict
the professional involvement in making a professional assessment of the
models and the risk management function and while doing so, make recom-
mendations for improvement if so needed.
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5 Some Relevant Dutch Laws
5.1 Law on identification with services (further: WID)
The WID was enacted in 1993 and is aimed at identifying clients of financial
institutions. The identification of clients is a direct result of the ‘Know Your
Customer’ recommendation made by FATF and the European Directive 91/
308 regarding the prevention of abuse of the financial system for money
laundering.
Pursuant to the Governmental Execution Order of 24 February 2003,1
certain groups or market parties are obliged to identify clients prior to pro-
viding professional services. Banks have the obligation to identify clients
prior to engaging into a client relationship. The external auditor who is
engaged in an audit, a review or a compilation of financial statements is
also among the groups that have an obligation to identify clients.2 This
execution order is the result of the enactment in the Netherlands of the
revised European Directive 2001/97 of 4 December 2001.
It is essential that the external auditor is not allowed to provide services,
as described above, prior to identifying the client. In certain cases, particu-
larly in the international practice, the identification of the client cannot
take place in the Netherlands. It is possible that this identification be per-
formed by a third party i.e. an external auditor of a member firm abroad.3
During 2007, preparations are ongoing to amend the WID and to com-
bine this law with the Law on Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (see para-
graph 5.2). The amendment of the ‘WID’ does have consequences for banks
in the process of identification of clients. The identification process is
strengthened and client due diligence procedures are needed in all cases of
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1. Governmental Execution Order (algemene maatregel van bestuur) of 24 February 2003,
Governmental Gazette 2003, 94.
2. Ibid Article 1 (e), Article 4 (h)2.
3. Explanatory memorandum (nota van toelichting), paragraph 2.1.2, Governmental Gazette
2003, 94.
client acceptance. These procedures are called ‘client acceptance procedures’
or sometimes ‘client acceptance and anti-money laundering’ procedures.
The absence of proper KYC procedures at banks may result in unwanted
multiple risk exposure. Banks may become overly exposed in the areas of
counterparty risk, reputation risk, operational risk, legal risk and concentra-
tion risk (BCBS, 2001, p. 3-4). Pursuant to the BCBS banks are required ‘to
have in place adequate policies, practices and procedures that promote high
ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank from being used,
intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal elements’ (BCBS, 2001, p. 5).
Client acceptance procedures aimed at KYC or extended KYC should prin-
cipally be risk based. Different risk levels can be distinguished i.e.:
– neutral risk;
– increased risk; and
– high risk.
Neutral risk generally applies to bank clients who require standard banking
services only such as salary accounts, saving accounts and simple loan or
mortgage accounts. The client acceptance procedure for neutral risk clients
is basic and based on official identification documentation, copy of which
must be kept by the bank.
Increased risk applies to clients who need additional banking services
such as business accounts, foreign exchange or international payment ser-
vices. In addition to identification documentation, also business charters,
annual financial statements and background information for these clients is
needed in order to comply with the KYC requirements. This information can
be maintained and updated based on client calls and visits of which records
have to be kept by the bank.
High risk applies to more complex business conglomerates who require
advanced (international) banking services and who will normally use multi-
ple (sometimes hundreds or even thousands) of bank accounts. There is one
category of clients that is high risk by default i.e. so-called ‘politically
exposed persons’. These clients maintain political or governmental positions
or had such a position within one year ago. According to the explanatory
memorandum with the proposal to combine the WID and the Law on Dis-
closure of Unusual Transactions,4 the expression ‘politically exposed per-
sons’ is now also introduced in the Dutch law.
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4. Explanatory Memorandum (memorie van toelichting), Wet tot samenvoeging van de Wet
identificatie bij dienstverlening en de Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties (Wet ter voor-
koming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (31238), see www.minfin.nl.
The client acceptance procedures for high risk clients are extended,
which means that comprehensive documentation of these clients must be
maintained and kept. Normally teams of client relationship bankers keep in
touch with the client and keep this information updated based on regular
client calls and visits. Extensive information must be available about the
business purpose and rationale of the various banking products required by
the client. The most difficult part of extended client due diligence is obtain-
ing an understanding of the nature of the client’s (international) business.
This includes obtaining an understanding of the circle of businesses and
persons with whom the bank’s client maintains business relationships or in
other words: trying to ‘know the client’s clients’.
Regarding compliance with the WID and the related client acceptance pro-
cedures, the internal auditor plays an important role. Internal audit has to
validate the client acceptance procedures applied by the bank indepen-
dently and report thereon to top management and the audit committee.
This means that an audit of the bank’s client acceptance procedures must
be part of the annual internal audit programme.
Furthermore, the work performed by internal audit is an important
source of information for regulatory authorities upon the execution of
supervisory visits.
5.2 Law on disclosure of unusual transactions
Following the European Directive 91/308, the Dutch Law on Disclosure of
Unusual Transactions (further: Wet MOT) was enacted at the end of 1993
and became effective in 1994 for financial institutions. The purpose of the
Wet MOT is to take appropriate measures to combat money laundering and
the financing of terrorism through a mandatory system of reporting of sus-
picious activities to a central reporting agency, i.e. the financial intelligence
unit Netherlands (further: FIU-NL). The FIU-NL has its legal foundation in
Title 2 of the Wet MOT. Its legal purpose is to gather, register and analyse
data received as a result of unusual transaction reports and to support the
pursuit of investigative and legal action in an attempt to curtail financial
crime. The FIU-NL has the ability to share information with foreign intelli-
gence units in order to support international legal pursuit of financial
crime. Since 2003, a duty to report suspicious activities exists for certain
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service providers. Based on a governmental execution order,5 external audi-
tors are among the service providers who have the duty to report suspicious
activities to the FIU-NL. Compliance with the Wet MOT by external auditors
is supervised by the Office of Financial Supervision (further: BFT).
An unusual transaction has to be reported to the FIU-NL if this activity is in
line with so-called indicators. The lawmaker has issued an indicator list
comprising objective and subjective indicators. For different parties that
have the legal obligation to report unusual transactions under the Wet
MOT, there are different indicator lists.6 For the external auditor, the follow-
ing objective indicators apply:
– Transactions that need to be reported to the police or to the department
of justice also need to be reported to the FIU-NL.
– Cash transactions or transactions in bearer cheques of more than
EUR 15,000 paid to or through the external auditor.
Next to the objective indicators there are so-called subjective indicators,
which are very broadly defined. Both for banks and for professional service
providers, among others the external auditor, the subjective indicator is
‘any transaction that may give rise to a suspicion that the transactionis
related to money laundering or terrorist financing’.
Anyone who provides a service on an occupational or commercial basis is
obliged to disclose to the FIU-NL, without delay, any unusual transaction
performed or planned in connection with that service (Wet MOT, Article 9,
paragraph 1). Based on this article, a reportable condition exists when there
is an intention (‘planned’) or an actual execution of an unusual transaction.
The external auditor has a duty to report intended or executed unusual
transactions that are intended or executed in connection with the profes-
sional services supplied by the auditor (italics by author). The connection
requirement may give rise to interpretation difficulties. These difficulties
may arise with regard to direct and indirect connection of the external audi-
tor and with regard to the group auditor who is responsible for the audit of
the consolidated financial statements of an international conglomerate. In
this regard it is important to define the meaning of ‘connection’. In general
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tal Gazette 2003, 94.
6. See http://www.minfin.nl/nl/onderwerpen,financiele_markten/integriteit/wet_melding_-
ongebruikelijke_transacties/indicatorenlijst.html#a7.
terms, an auditor may become ‘connected’ with an unusual transaction
while executing a professional engagement for a client. The professional
engagement is defined as the
– audit of the financial statements; or
– review of the financial statements; or
– compilation of the financial statements7.
Direct connection
There is a direct connection with the transaction when an amount of EUR
15,000 or more in cash or bearer checks is paid directly or through the
external auditor. In case an amount of EUR 15,000 or more is paid directly
to or through the auditor, the ‘connection’ is clear and consequently the
duty to file a report to the FIU-NL exists.
Indirect connection
It becomes more difficult when there is no direct payment of EUR 15,000 or
more to or through the external auditor or if there are no traces (yet) of an
unusual transaction in the accounting records, or when there is a plan or
the intention of a transaction that might be unusual. In this case there is no
duty to report as a result of the objective indicator, but there may be a duty
to report pursuant to the subjective indicator.
Provided that the external auditor is informed about the planned trans-
action, he has to assess whether the transaction is unusual in the sense of
the law and whether duty to report exists. The external auditor does not
have a duty to actively search for such transactions nor does he have to pro-
duce conclusive evidence of the unusual character. The duty to report is
solely the result of an assessment made by the external auditor.8
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7. Governmental Execution Order (algemene maatregel van bestuur) of 24 February 2003,
Article 2-1, sub f, Governmental Gazette 2003, 94.
8. Richtsnoeren voor de interpretatie van de Wet identificatie bij dienstverlening en de Wet
melding ongebruikelijke transacties voor belastingadviseurs en openbare accountants, Versie
2.3, november 2006. It should be noted that the ‘Richtsnoeren’ are not legally binding
and that the BFT may have a different i.e. broader interpretation in some case.
Responsibility of the independent group auditor in an audit of the
consolidated financial statements of an international conglomerate
Another difficulty may arise in the case that the Dutch external auditor is
the independent group auditor9 of an international conglomerate. There
may be instances that unusual transactions occur in a foreign group com-
pany within this conglomerate, i.e. in another jurisdiction than the Nether-
lands. These transactions may be unusual as a result of the Dutch objective
or subjective indicators. The question is whether or not the independent
group auditor has a duty to report these unusual transactions to the
FIU-NL? In order to answer this question, there are two sub-questions to be
answered i.e.:
– Is the external group auditor connected with the transaction?
– Does the external group auditor have knowledge of the transaction?
In the first place, it should be established that the independent group audi-
tor is professionally connected with the unusual transaction, as required by
Article 9, Wet MOT. Mostly, this is the case as the group auditor performs
an audit of the consolidated financial statements in which the financial
statements of the group company, forming part of the conglomerate are
consolidated. If the transaction has taken place and traces thereof are
reflected in the group company’s accounting records, the independent
group auditor is connected in the sense of Article 9, Wet MOT. If the unu-
sual transaction is ‘intended’, but has not yet taken place, the connection in
the sense of Article 9, Wet MOT is less clear and may not be adequate.
Secondly, it should be established whether the independent group audi-
tor is informed about the unusual character of the transaction in the foreign
group company. If the unusual character of the transaction is mentioned in
a document of any kind such as:
– audit files or audit working papers of the local external auditor;
– interoffice memorandums to the group auditor;
– management letters;
– email correspondence;
– minutes of meetings or in any other kind of document;
– internal audit working papers;
– internal audit reports or memorandums such as
o business understanding documents;
§ 5.2
38
9. The ‘independent group auditor’ is the external auditor who is ultimately professionally
responsible for the independent financial audit of the conglomerate’s consolidated finan-
cial statements.
o risk analysis documents;
o interim or final audit reports
the independent group auditor is then aware or should have been aware of
the transaction. Hence, he has to consider whether or not a report to the
FIU-NL has to be made. If the independent group auditor considers that the
transaction is unusual as a result of an objective indicator or if he considers
that it is unusual as a result of the subjective indicator, a report to the
FIU-NL should be made. This is solely the professional interpretation made
by the independent group auditor.
A remaining question is whether the FIU-NL has jurisdiction pursuant to
a report made by the Dutch independent group auditor of an unusual trans-
action that has taken place outside the Netherlands, but within the Dutch
conglomerate. The independent group auditor does not need to make this
consideration. It is a matter of international law and should be considered
by the FIU-NL rather than by the auditor.
In line with auditing standard 250,10 the external auditor has to perform a
risk analysis of non-compliance with applicable law and regulations by the
client and has to access the potential impact this may have on the financial
statements. However, it should not be expected that an audit of the finan-
cial statements reveals all instances of non-compliance with applicable law
and regulation.11
The question is what is exactly ‘non-compliance with applicable law and
regulations’? In the first place, this is a legal interpretation, which may sur-
pass the core competence of the external auditor. Normally, a legal expert
makes an assessment regarding ‘non-compliance with applicable law and
regulations’. The external auditor performs the audit of the financial state-
ments. In this context he has to make an analysis of the risk of non-compli-
ance with applicable law and regulations and accordingly has to assess the
potential impact thereof on the financial statements. The practical conse-
quence is that the external auditor asks questions regarding compliance
with applicable law and regulations and that an audit of the compliance
function will normally be included in the audit scope. However, it should
be born in mind that an audit of the financial statements is not aimed at
disclosing issues of non-compliance with applicable law and regulations. It
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10. Royal NIVRA, International Standards on Auditing 250, Responsibilities Relating to Laws
and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements.
11. Ibid paragraph 2.
may therefore occur that instances of non-compliance occur while the
external auditor remains unaware.
According to Title 6, Article 18 and 19 of the Wet MOT, an unusual transac-
tion report to the FIU-NL is a confidential report. The reason behind this
confidentiality of unusual transaction reporting is the prevention of poten-
tial destruction of evidence by alleged perpetrators of money laundering or
terrorist financing. This means that neither banks nor external auditors
have the ability to communicate a report to the FIU-NL to their clients. Nor
can external auditors communicate a report to the FIU-NL to a bank even if
the bank is an audit client or to a succeeding auditor in a case of change of
auditors. Hence, this may result in double or multiple reports made to the
FIU-NL on the same unusual transaction. However, this is neither the con-
cern of the external auditor nor of the financial institution which may also
have reported the same unusual transaction. Double or multiple reports, if
any, will be reflected in the records maintained by the FIU-NL.
In the case of alleged fraud, the nature of the alleged fraud may give rise
to the suspicion of money laundering and as such give rise to the need to
make a report to the FIU-NL. Based on auditing standard 240,12 the external
auditor is obliged to communicate indications of fraud with management
and in certain cases with the audit committee. However, the external audi-
tor cannot communicate the fact that the alleged fraud may have been the
content of an unusual transaction report to the FIU-NL. When the auditor is
asked whether or not there are Wet MOT implications, the answer can only
be that the auditor cannot comment on or reply to this question. This is cer-
tainly not easy and may put a strain on the professional trust relationship
between the auditor and the client. However, this is a situation ‘the auditing
profession has to live with’.13
5.3 Law on financial supervision
Since 1 January 2007, the Law on Financial Supervision (further: WFT) is
applicable in the Netherlands. This law supersedes previous laws regulating
the financial sector. The purpose of the WFT is to provide clarity regarding
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the various norms and standards that apply to the financial sector. Whether
the Dutch lawmaker has been successful in bringing clarity remains ques-
tionable. The WFT is a complex law and according to Vletter (2006) some
people already called for a revision of this law at the time of enactment.
With regard to the supervision, the WFT makes a distinction between
prudential supervision, which is the task of the Dutch Central Bank (further:
DNB) and behavioural supervision, which is the task of the Authority of
Financial Markets (further: AFM). In this respect, with the enactment of the
WFT, the Netherlands applies a system of so-called functional supervision
of the financial sector.
Pursuant to the WFT, the external auditor has a role in the supervision of
financial companies. The main tasks and responsibilities for the external
auditor are laid down in subchapter 3.3.10 ‘Meldingsplichten van de accoun-
tant en de actuaris’. Subchapter 3.3.10 applies to the roles and responsibil-
ities of the external auditor vis-a`-vis the DNB, in other words: the roles and
responsibilities in the sense of prudential supervision. Similar roles and
responsibilities exist vis-a`-vis the AFM in the context of behavioural super-
vision pursuant to subchapter 4.2.4. ‘Meldingsplichten’ of the law.
According to Article 3:88 of the WFT, the external auditor performing the
audit of the financial statements of the financial company has the duty to
report any instances of which he has knowledge indicating:
– a breach of the obligations laid down in Chapter 3 (Prudential Supervi-
sion) of the WFT;
– a potential discontinuation of the financial company.
According to Article 4:27 WFT, the external auditor performing the audit of
the financial statements of the financial company has the duty to report
any instances of which he has knowledge indicating a breach of the obliga-
tions laid down in Chapter 4 (Behavioural Supervision) of the WFT. A report
made pursuant to Article 3:88 has to be made to DNB. A report made pur-
suant to Article 4:27 has to be made to the AFM. The external auditor
informs the financial company when he intends to submit the requested
information to the DNB or to the AFM. If the financial company so wishes,
it can provide the regulator with the required information directly, in which
case the external auditor must ascertain that the required information is
indeed submitted. In the case that the external auditor submits information
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to the regulator, he must send a copy of this information to the financial
company.14
A distinction should be made between the duty to report following Article
3:88 of the WFT and the obligation to inform the DNB following the Execu-
tion Order ‘Besluit prudentie¨le regels Wft’, dated 12 October 2006.15 The flow
of information from the auditor to the DNB is broader than the instances
mentioned in Article 3:88 of the WFT. In order to inform the regulators, the
external auditor has to submit the following documents:16
– the auditor’s report to the managing board and the supervisory board;
– the management letter(s);
– other correspondence between the external auditor and the financial
company which is directly connected with the auditor’s opinion with the
financial statements or regulatory statements;
– upon request of the regulator, the external auditor must provide subse-
quent information about the items mentioned before.
Analysing the external auditor’s responsibility pursuant to this execution
order, it is clear that only information has to be submitted to the regulator
that is directly connected with the audit of the financial or regulatory state-
ments. Information that is derived from other roles conducted by the exter-
nal auditor is not required and does not fall into the scope of the duty to
report.
Similar to the information flow to the DNB, there is an information flow
to the AFM. With regard to informing the AFM, Execution Order ‘Besluit
gedragstoezicht financie¨le ondernemingen Wft’17 applies. The external auditor
has to submit:18
– the auditor’s report to the managing board and the supervisory board.
– the management letter(s).
– other correspondence between the external auditor and the financial
company which is directly connected with the auditor’s opinion with the
financial statements or regulatory statements.
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15. Execution Order of 12 October 2006, ‘Besluit prudentie¨le regels Wft’.
16. Ibid Article 136.
17. Execution Order, dated 12 October 2006, ‘Besluit gedragstoezicht financie¨le ondernemin-
gen Wft’.
18. Ibid Article 107.
Similar to the duty to report to DNB, the reporting can be done directly by
the financial company, in which case, the external auditor has to ensure
that appropriate reporting has indeed taken place.19
Analysing Article 3:88 and 4:27 WFT as well as the relevant articles in the
Execution Orders, it is important to note that the obligation to make a
report to DNB or to AFM is restricted to the external auditor performing the
audit of the financial statements and regulatory statements. This means that
the reporting duty does not apply to any other role the external auditor may
have in the relationship with the client. In practice and strictly speaking,
this means that an external auditor who conducts a special investigation or
who acts as an advisor to a financial company and in connection with this
assignment becomes aware of a breach of the provisions laid down in the
WFT by the financial company and does not have to make a report to DNB
or to the AFM.
In many instances though, it will be difficult to make a clear distinction
in the different roles the external auditor may have. If the external auditor
becomes aware of a breach of the WFT or of any other reportable condition,
it is not always possible to clearly determine the role the external auditor
has at the moment he becomes aware of it. It is therefore strongly recom-
mended that the external auditor consults with the audit firm’s professional
practices department prior to making a report to the regulators in these
cases. However, in the case that the external auditor is engaged to perform
the audit of the financial and regulatory statements of the financial com-
pany, it is difficult to argue he has become aware of reportable conditions
in another role than as auditor of the financial or regulatory statements.
Regulators would expect that the lead external auditor (the ‘engagement
partner’) is aware of all engagements of the audit firm with the financial
company and as a result that the lead external auditor is also informed
about the results of the other engagements. This is certainly the case in
engagements with financial companies whose shares are listed in the United
States. In this situation every engagement, regardless the financial magni-
tude or geographical location of the engagement, must be pre-approved by
the company’s audit committee.20 Such pre-approval requests are made by
the lead external auditor hence he is usually informed about all ongoing
engagements. Consequently, the duty to report pursuant to the WFT should
be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly.
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According to Article 3:88, paragraph 5 and Article 4:27, paragraph 5, the
regulators will enable the financial company to attend the meeting at
which the external auditor will make the report. In practice, however, the
external auditor should prefer to encourage the client to make the report
directly to the regulators. In this situation, the role of the external auditor is
to confirm the report made by the financial company. In fact, a report made
by the external auditor directly to the regulators should be reserved for rare
instances where management is unwilling to make the report or where the
auditor has serious observations with regard to management’s capabilities
or integrity.
5.4 Exonerations
Based on Article 3:88, paragraph 6, the external auditor is exonerated from
potential civil law suits that may arise pursuant to making a mandatory
report to the DNB. This exoneration applies unless in all fairness and given
the circumstances, the external auditor should not have reported to the reg-
ulators. A similar exoneration applies pursuant to Article 4:27, paragraph 6
for mandatory reports made to the AFM.
An exoneration clause is also included in Article 13, Wet MOT. Also in
this article, the restriction is that the exoneration does not apply to cases
where in all fairness and given the circumstances, the reporting institution/
person (e.g. the external auditor) should not have reported to the FIU-NL.
These exonerations apply to civil law suits against the reporting institu-
tion/person (e.g. the external auditor) who made a report pursuant to the
legal obligation as laid down in the law (WFT or Wet MOT). As such, compa-
nies suffering financial damage resulting from such a report cannot make a
claim to the reporting institution/person (e.g. the external auditor).
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6 Conclusions
In summary, the protection of the financial market against abuse is essential
for the licence to operate that financial companies have. As stated in the
introduction, the combat against financial crime is not just an external bat-
tle. Banks must establish proper organisations and good corporate govern-
ance. In this address, I have emphasised the consequences following
European and Regulatory law and regulations for banks in general and for
the audit function more in particular.
The first initiatives in European lawmaking regarding the combat against
money laundering date back to the early 1980s. During the 1980s and
1990s, the 40 FATF Recommendations and the nine special FATF Recom-
mendations against terrorist financing have been included in the European
Directives. Based on these European Directives, the Dutch law has been
adjusted accordingly. Further modifications to the Dutch law are still
ongoing such as combining the WID with the Wet MOT.
The roles and responsibilities of auditors in the context of protecting finan-
cial market integrity is laid down in various laws and regulations. A distinc-
tion should be made between external and internal auditors. The Dutch law,
in particular the WFT, the WID and the Wet MOT prescribe certain legal
responsibilities for the external auditor, such as the duty to report specific
instances of breaches of the law and potential insolvency of a financial com-
pany to regulatory authorities and the obligation to furnish the regulators
with more broad information contained in formal reports and management
letters.
Regarding the reporting duties for external auditors following the Wet
MOT, I have drawn the conclusion that such duty may also exist when unu-
sual transactions occur within an international conglomerate, but outside
the Netherlands. The legal consequences of such a report to the FIU-NL is
not for the external auditor to consider, but a consideration to be made by
the FIU-NL.
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Furthermore, as a result of the confidentiality clause in the Wet MOT, it
is possible that the FIU-NL does receive multiple reports with regard to one
single unusual transaction. This is the result of the fact that communication
about a report made to the FIU-NL is confidential and that communication
about such a report is prohibited.
The roles and responsibilities of the internal auditor are laid down in
authoritative papers promulgated by the BCBS, which form the basis of the
design of corporate governance structures of financial companies. In this
structure, a distinct independent position is prescribed for internal audit
with reporting lines to top management and the audit committee of the
supervisory board. Similar positions are prescribed for the compliance and
risk management functions in financial companies. The establishment of
these three functions is no longer voluntary, but forms part of good corpo-
rate governance of financial companies.
Finally, I have emphasised the role of auditor from the perspective of law-
making with a certain focus on anti-money laundering and terrorist finan-
cing. I want the emphasise again that this is only part of the entire battle
field of financial market abuse. Financial companies must establish proper
organisations including proper segregations of duties between front and
back office (‘Chinese Walls’), pre-employment screening of management
and staff, the identification and screening of integrity sensitive positions,
procedures for personal account dealing and the prevention of the use of
privileged knowledge. This address did not elaborate on the aspects of inter-
nal organisation. This will be subject to further study and publications.
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onderzoek naar de verantwoordelijkheid van de accountant voor de preven-
tie, de ontdekking en de rapportering van fraude. Daarnaast werkten wij
jaren samen in het kader van de opleiding tot accountant.
Jullie begeleiding bij mijn promotieonderzoek, vooral in de afrondings-
fase, heeft ertoe bijgedragen dat het onderzoek succesvol en tijdig kon wor-
den afgerond. Ondanks het feit dat ik binnen de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerd-
heid ben benoemd, hoop ik de gelegenheid te krijgen om mij in de komende
jaren te mogen blijven inzetten bij de opleiding tot accountant aan deze
universiteit.
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Waarde Schilder, Moison, Bosman en Hage, Beste Arnold, Hans, Rob en
Maarten
In de afgelopen maanden hebben wij met elkaar contact gehad over het
onderwerp van mijn oratie. We hebben gesproken en gediscussieerd over
de rol van de accountant bij de handhaving van de integriteit van de finan-
cie¨le markt en over de interpretatie van de wetgeving op dit terrein. Jullie
bijdrage in de discussie en het commentaar op de conceptversie van het
boekje dat bij deze gelegenheid wordt uitgegeven stel ik in hoge mate op
prijs.
Waarde De Bos, Beste Auke
Al sinds 2001 werken wij samen in het kader van de opleiding voor
INSOLAD. Deze samenwerking is langzamerhand uitgegroeid tot een nauwe
samenwerking binnen de sectie financieel recht. Inmiddels proberen we de
noodzakelijke derde geldstroom ook op gang te krijgen door andere clie¨nten
te bedienen. Ik ben enthousiast dat ik naast jou binnen de Faculteit der
Rechtsgeleerdheid ben benoemd tot hoogleraar en ik hoop dat onze samen-
werking zich nog vele jaren zal mogen voortzetten.
Group Audit van ABN AMRO, Beste collegae
De afgelopen jaren heb ik binnen Group Audit van ABN AMRO een fantasti-
sche tijd gehad. Ik kenschets de afgelopen jaren als een periode van grote
verandering in organisatorisch opzicht, maar ook in professioneel opzicht.
Het is een eer om met collegae te mogen werken die meegaan in het voort-
durend streven naar een hoog professioneel niveau en kwaliteit. Daarnaast
geeft het ook een bijzonder gevoel om met collegae samen te werken waar-
mee ook op persoonlijk vlak een goede band bestaat. Dit geldt zowel voor
het Global Management Committee als voor de vele medewerkers die
wereldwijd in onze afdeling werken. Ik dank jullie voor het in mij gestelde
vertrouwen, voor de intense discussies, voor jullie feedback, voor het aan-
dragen van oplossingsrichtingen voor vaak moeilijke vraagstukken, voor de
steun als ik het moeilijk had en bovenal voor de vriendschap.
Waarde Groenink, Beste Rijkman
We hebben de afgelopen vijf jaren intensief samengewerkt, jij als voorzitter
van de Raad van Bestuur van ABN AMRO Bank NV en ik als Global Head of
Group Audit. Jouw invulling van de rol van voorzitter van de Raad van
Bestuur is cruciaal geweest voor de ontwikkeling die Group Audit bij ABN
AMRO heeft mogen doormaken. Jij hebt de ruimte gegeven voor een onaf-
hankelijke opstelling. Je hebt tegenspraak geaccepteerd en je stond borg
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voor de positie van Group Audit jegens je collegae in de Raad van Bestuur.
Samen maakten we de veranderingen door die het gevolg waren van de
invoering van de Sarbanes Oxley Wet. Plotseling moest het hoofd van
Group Audit direct gaan rapporteren aan jouw toezichthouders in de Raad
van Commissarissen. Maar ook deze – in de Nederlandse context – wezen-
lijke verandering heb je gesteund en verdedigd.
Als geen ander weet ik hoezeer het je aan het hart ging toen ABN AMRO
negatief in het nieuws kwam als gevolg van incidenten op het terrein van
compliance en hoezeer jij je persoonlijk hebt ingezet om compliance een
gezicht te geven en op een significant hoger plan te brengen. Jouw persoon-
lijke inzet en integriteit zijn fundamenteel geweest voor het opzetten en
ontwikkelen van een world-class compliance omgeving binnen ABN AMRO.
Deze compliance omgeving is thans een voorbeeld in Nederland en mijns
inziens ook ver daarbuiten. Het Nederlandse en internationale bankwezen is
jou veel dank hiervoor verschuldigd.
Jij hebt je persoonlijk ingezet om de leerstoel ‘Compliance and Risk
Management in the Financial Sector’ aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
mogelijk te maken. Ik ben je dankbaar voor onze samenwerking in de afge-
lopen jaren en voor je steun in mijn wetenschappelijke loopbaan.
Lieve Petra, Robin en Rogier
Geen enkele persoon kan in zijn leven succesvol zijn zonder de steun van
het thuisfront. Jullie steun is onvoorwaardelijk en van onschatbare beteke-
nis. Ik hou van jullie!
Ik heb gezegd.
Dankwoord
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